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WHERE TO GO AFTER KELO? BACK TO
THE FUTURE!*
HARRY

P.

CARROLL,

ESQ.t

"{PJoverty is the parent of revolution and crime."l
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. New London 2
aroused a great deal of public controversy.3 For the most part,
alarm over the Kelo case is rooted in misinformation about the facts
and a misunderstanding of the law. The Kelo case illustrates how a
public-private partnership can successfully change poverty-produc
ing conditions into prosperity-promoting conditions. The United
States Constitution does not prevent the government from using its
sovereign power to create conditions that help the American peo
ple prosper. To contend otherwise is to ignore common sense and
the history of civilization, to say nothing of constitutional law. Re
ducing poverty among the people of the United States "insure[s]
domestic Tranquility, ... promote[s] the general Welfare, and se

* This essay was prepared for the Issues in Community Economic Development
symposium held at Western New England College School of Law on March 24, 2006.
t Attorney Carroll is a member of the Massachusetts Bar. His extensive legal
experience includes work on all aspects of eminent domain acquisition, serving as lead
trial counsel in state eminent domain jury trials, and providing legal advice to decision
makers in connection with eminent domain and other development projects. He is an
occasional speaker on legal topics at professional events.
1. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 2.6.1265b12, in 2 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 445, 461
(W.D. Ross ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 2d ed., Univ. Chicago Press 1990), reprinted in
8 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (Mortimer J. Adler, ed. 1996).
2. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo Ill), 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, The "Backlash" So Far: Will Citizens Get Meaning
ful Eminent Domain Reform?, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: EMINENT DOMAIN
AND LAND VALUATION LITIGATION 703, 703 (2006), available at http://d2d.ali-aba.org/_
files/thumbs/course_materials/cl049-ch28_thumb.pdf ("[T)he eminent domain case of
Kelo v. New London was greeted with anger and frustration in the popular media and
in the halls of Congress. Editorials and magazine articles expressed popular outrage at
the idea that a person's property can be condemned and transferred to another private
party for development and private profit. The House of Representatives passed a reso
lution, by a vote of 365 to 33, expressing 'the grave disapproval of the House of Repre
sentatives regarding the majority opinion of the Supreme Court.'" (citations omitted)
(quoting H.R. Res. 340, 109th Congo (2005))).
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cure[s] the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."4
Although the above appears self-explanatory, the misinformation
generated about Kelo has created considerable public consterna
tion; therefore, it seems appropriate, if not essential, to attempt to
set the record straight. Reviewing Kelo in its true context demon
strates that real economic development is a proper public use of the
eminent domain power. That context, a topic worthy of study in its
own right, clarifies the contours of the key Keto problem, helps
identify the only viable way to solve it, and reveals why eminent
domain was exercised to effectuate the solution.
I.

A.

THE FACTS

The Growth and Decline of New London

New London, Connecticut, is situated near the mouth of the
Thames River on Long Island Sound. It was founded in 1646 by
Puritan John Winthrop of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.5 When
he was a twenty-four year old colonel in the Virginia militia,
George Washington slept there. 6 During the Revolutionary War,
New London was partially burned by British forces under the com
mand of Benedict Arnold. 7 It was blockaded by the British in the
War of 1812.8 New London "reached the height of its maritime
prosperity in the [nineteenth century] when it flourished as a ship
ping, shipbuilding, and whaling port."9
In the latter part of the twentieth century, New London en
tered a slow spiral of deterioration. After "[d]ecades of economic
4. U.S. CaNsT. pmbl.
5. "New London ... is home to the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Connecticut
College, and Mitchell College. Famous New Londoners include Revolutionary War
hero Nathan Hale and playwright Eugene O'Neil!." New London Public Library, http:/
/www.lioninc.org/newlondon (last visited Dec. 26, 2006); see also The New London Ga
zette, A Winter Visitor, http://www.newlondongazette.comJgeorgew.html (last visited
Dec. 26, 2006) [hereinafter "A Winter Visitor"] (describing George Washington's visit
to New London as a twenty-four year old colonel in the Virginia militia).
6. A Winter Visitor, supra note 5.
7. See Albert E. Van Dusen, British Raid on New London and Groton, http://
www.ctheritage.org/encyclopedialct1763_1818Ibritish_nl....groton.htm (last visited Dec.
26,2006) (describing Arnold's raid on New London and Groton as "[t]he final British
attack on Connecticut" of the Revolutionary War and stating that it "was the most
perfidious and brutal of the war").
8. BENSON J. LOSSING, PICTORAL FIELD BOOK OF THE WAR OF 1812, at 888
(1869), available at http://freepages.history.rootsweb.comJ-wcarrl/Lossing2/Chap38
.htm!.
9. New London Public Library, http://www.lioninc.org/newlondon (visited on
Dec. 26, 2006; on file with Western New England Law Review).
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decline,"10 this once flourishing historic community withered away
as its economy slowly died. By 1990, worsening economic condi
tions in New London led to the city's classification as a "distressed
municipality"l1 under Connecticut's State Commerce Act. 12 That
classification meant, among other things, that New London had fi
nally sunk to the "quantitative physical and economic distress
thresholds"13 required for eligibility in a federal grant program gen
erally called UDAG.14 Thereafter, conditions in New London got
worse. In 1996, New London sustained "serious employment de
clines ... with the loss of approximately 1900 government sector
positions, and the closure of the United States Naval Undersea
Warfare Center ... , which transferred more than 1000 positions to
Newport, Rhode Island."15
By 1998, New London had hit bottom. Its "unemployment
rate was nearly double that of the State, and its population of just
under 24,000 residents was at its lowest since 1920."16 The Fort
Trumbull area of New London was hit especially hard. Historically,
this ninety-acre peninsula, zoned for commercial and industrial
use,17 had been an important part of the New London economy.
As the Fort Trumbull economy slowly died, New London's eco
nomic distress grew worse. When the city's condition deteriorated
to the point where public action had to be taken, the obvious place
to start was the Fort Trumbull peninsula. Unless this key economic
engine could be restarted, the once proud, but now impoverished
10. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo Ill), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
11. The Connecticut Supreme Court refers to New London as a "distressed city."
Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo /I), 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004), affd, 125 S. Ct.
2655 (2005). Connecticut defines "distressed municipalities," CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32
9p(b) (2000), but it does so in a manner that is interchangeable with the "distressed
city" phrase in Kelo. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-9p(g) (2000) (stating, '''[m]unicipality'
means any town, city or borough in the state").
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-1a (2005).
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-9p(b).
14. The Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) is a federal program admin
istered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The
UDAG program was authorized under the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1977. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, ch. 119, 91 Stat. 1125
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (2000)); see also 24 C.F.R. § 570.450-66 (1996)
(regulating the UDAG program).
15. Kelo II, 843 A.2d at 510.
16. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo lI/), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
17. Defendants' Exh. 34, Draft Envtl. Impact Evaluation: Fort Trumbull MDP
Area (1998), Kelo Ill, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (No. 04-108), available at 2004 WL 2921787, at
*239, *288 [hereinafter Fort Trumbull MDP Area].
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and polluted, historic community of New London would continue
to crumble.
B.

Reviving New London
1.

The Hidden Opportunity

When the Fort Trumbull area was prosperous, New London's
economy remained strong. As the private sector shut down and left
the Fort Trumbull area, the large number of government jobs lo
cated there continued to provide some financial stability. However,
when the government jobs were downsized, outsourced, or relo
cated, the local economy began to collapse. 18 Private charity and
public welfare cannot end poverty or bring about prosperity: "All
the soup kitchens and homeless shelters in the world cannot substi
tute for community and economic development which provide jobs
with decent wages, and dignity."19 To stop its slide into ruin, New
London needed to lure the private sector back to the Fort Trumbull
area.
If a large, prosperous company could be persuaded to build a
major facility in the area and create hundreds of new jobs, it might
be sufficient to halt the economic decline. The task was formidable
for many reasons. At anyone time, few companies have both the
need for a new facility of the necessary magnitude and the financial
capacity to build it. The competition for the few such companies in
the market is global in scope. Therefore, to compete, New London
needed a site with sufficiently attractive features.
New London had the New London Mills site. This site had
nearly all the attributes needed to be competitive: it was vacant, it
was cleared, and it was ready for immediate development. Even
with that site, however, New London's ability to attract the needed
new employer was far from a sure thing-the New London Mills
site was polluted. Any company that can invest hundreds of mil
lions of dollars and create thousands of new jobs paying good wages
has many options when it comes to constructing a major new facil
ity. Businesses are understandably reluctant to make the significant
capital investment necessary to buy, build, and conduct business on
18. See, e.g., Keto II, 843 A.2d at 542.
19. Marian Wright Edelman, Founder, Children's Def. Fund, Standing Up For
the World's Children: Leave No Child Behind, Address Before the State of the World
Forum (cir. 1996) (transcript available at Gifts of Speech, http://gos.sbc.edu/e/edelman
.hlml).
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a polluted site. 20 Although the New London Mills site was bur
dened with this problem, the burden was not insurmountable. The
site's advantages made it quite attractive notwithstanding the pollu
tion problem. Standing alone, the New London Mills site was a very
tempting investment opportunity; but the site did not stand alone.
The New London Mills site was adjacent to the Fort Trumbull
peninsula; and that was the problem. The Fort Trumbull peninsula
housed the regional wastewater treatment facility, which emitted
foul odors21 and was part of the disintegrating Fort Trumbull penin
sula. Both the New London Mills site and the Fort Trumbull penin
sula were serviced by a decrepit infrastructure. The deplorable
conditions on the Fort Trumbull peninsula were deal-killers for the
type of major new private investment at the New London Mills site
necessary to halt New London's economic decline. No investor
would risk the private capital needed to make the New London
Mills site functional if the conditions on the adjacent Fort Trumbull
peninsula continued to deteriorate. In the past, the New London
economy prospered along with the Fort Trumbull peninsula. To
find the way out of poverty and back to prosperity, New London
needed to go back to its past and find a way back to the future:
"The past causes the present, and so the future."22
2.

Halting the Decline

Solving the problems on the Fort Trumbull peninsula, those in
hibiting successful marketing of the adjacent New London Mills site
and those making the whole peninsula economically obsolete,
would stop the economic decline and restore prosperity to New
London. The problems were related; therefore, a comprehensive
solution was needed. A patchwork approach would, at best, halt
the decline. An integrated solution for both problems was required
20. It is '''unusual' for a major employer to move 'into an urban area, especially
into a brown site ... that has environmental problems. They tend to go to suburban
areas, tend to go to green fields.'" Kelo II, 843 A.2d at 538 (quoting testimony from the
trial record).
21. Peter L. Costas, Dispelling the Myths About the Fort Trumbull Project, NEW
LONDON DAY, Nov. 6,2005, at C4; see also Warren Richey, A Fight to Keep Their
Homes, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 16, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor
.com/2005/0216/plls01-lihc.html (noting that "on hot summer days with no breeze, the
stench [from the wastewater treatment plant] blanketed the area"); Fort Trumbull MDP
Area, supra note 17, at *243-44 (stating that the development plan included an upgrade
to the current wastewater and sewage treatment facilities "to reduce odors, improve
aesthetics, and improve the quality of treated wastewater").
22. Peter N. Stearns, Why Study History?, AM. HIST. ASS'N (1998), available at
http://www.historians.orglpubs/free/whystudyhistory.htm.
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to restore prosperity. Furthermore, neither the public nor the pri
vate sector acting alone could solve the problem. The solution re
quired an informal yet effective public-private partnership to be
created, working out the problems inherent in such a significant
undertaking.
The solution involved two separate projects. The first project
was primarily a private economic-development project-to produce
new jobs and invest private capital for business purposes. This pri
vate project would put enough money in the local economy to halt
New London's continuing economic decline. The second project
was primarily a public economic-development project-to restart
the economic engine on the Fort Trumbull peninsula so it would
again become a mainstay of the New London economy. These two
projects would together restore prosperity on a long-term basis to
New London.
The private project materialized when Pfizer, Inc., a major in
ternational pharmaceutical company, announced its intention to
build its global research and development facility at the New
London Mills site. 23 William Longa, Pfizer's senior corporate coun
sel, testified that Pfizer was willing to locate its facility on the New
London Mills site, but only upon several conditions: an upgrade to
the wastewater treatment facility, a restoration of the Fort Trumbull
state park, and leveraging Pfizer's "significant local investment ...
into a benefit for the entire city."24
Pfizer's conditions would be difficult, but not impossible, to
satisfy. The strategy for doing so became the public project. It had
two major components. Some of the revitalization tasks needed in
the Fort Trumbull area were in the area of governmental responsi
bilities. The publicly owned regional sewage treatment facility
needed upgrading to rid the Fort Trumbull area of nuisance odors.25
The public infrastructure of the Fort Trumbull area needed modern
ization. Old Fort Trumbull had a heroic past,26 and although it was
no longer a significant contributor to our national defense, its rich
23. Lynne Tuohy, High Court to Test Seizure of Homes, HARTFORD COURANT,
Feb. 20, 2005, at AI.
24. Kelo v. City of New London (Keto ll), 843 A.2d 500, 538 (Conn. 2004), affd,
125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
25. See supra note 21.
26. Fort Trumbull, because of its location, played a part in the Revolutionary
War. In fact, the British captured the fort during the war and its courageous defenders
were killed. See, e.g., John Duchesneau, The History of Fort Trumbull, http://www.
geocities.com/-jmgould/trumhist.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2006).
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local history and beautiful geographical location made it a perfect
place to site a new public park.
However, performing the traditional governmental remedies of
cleaning up the site and improving the infrastructure would not re
store prosperity to the Fort Trumbull area. After all, few, if any,
new jobs would be created in performing those vital functions. For
prosperity to return to New London, the remaining two-thirds of
the Fort Trumbull peninsula had to be revitalized, not merely re
paired. That was the second component of the public project.
To maximize the potential for a successful revitalization effort,
it was critical that a comprehensive plan be developed for the entire
Fort Trumbull peninsula. To accomplish that complex task, one en
tity needed to acquire all the separate, privately owned parcels in
the area, as well as the former Naval Undersea Warfare Center
(NUWC) site, so that the land could be redeveloped in a way that
would complement and enhance the other public investments in the
new state park and other facilities. 27 The State of Connecticut real
ized this and in early 1998 took steps to create a state park at Fort
Trumbull,28
27. Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo and the Local Political Process, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
13, 18 (2005). A comprehensive development plan
entails a process that involves significant engagement by multiple actors in
public hearings concerning what should be constructed where and by whom.
One would anticipate that any such process will attract competing views-not
only between property owners and developers, but also among developers,
contractors, and planners ....
. . . [T]he presence of a plan implies that multiple current landowners are
at risk. Comprehensiveness and planning entail simultaneous consideration of
multiple parcels. The importance of that characteristic is derived from the
political concerns about eminent domain ... If eminent domain creates a risk
of ganging up on a discrete minority of landowners who, by virtue of their
small numbers, have little political power, then those concerns should diminish
as the number of landowners increases. There is little need for the affected
landowners to reach anything close to a majority to have effective political
voice.... [T]hose directly affected, those whose personal landholdings are at
risk, have sufficient incentive to become involved that even moderate numbers
of them can swamp the political process by which a final determination is
made .
. . . [These practical implications of a development plan] ensure both a
forum in which opposition to a proposed condemnation can be articulated
the hearings process that is implicated in the promulgation of a comprehensive
plan-and an environment in which those who do oppose the plan have suffi
cient political weight that their voices can effectively be heard.
Jd.
28. Kelo II, 843 A.2d at 508. In addition, in "January, 1998, the state bond com
mission authorized bonds to support planning activities in the Fort Trumbull area ...
and property acquisition to be undertaken ... in support of the project and other
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Eminent Domain: A Necessary Tool
1.

Overview of Eminent Domain

Governments may acquire property by every method available
to individuals. In addition, the government has a property acquisi
tion method that is unavailable to private citizens: eminent domain.
Eminent domain permits the government to take private property
from its owner without the owner's consent. The phrase "eminent
domain" was coined in 1625, but a rudimentary form of this prop
erty acquisition method was well known in ancient times.29 The Su
preme Court conceptualized the eminent domain power as an
implicit, inherent, part of government.
It requires no constitutional recognition; it is an attribute of sov

ereignty. The clause found in the Constitutions of the several
States providing for just compensation for property taken is a
mere limitation upon the exercise of the right. When the use is
public, the necessity or expediency of appropriating any particu
lar property is not a subject of judicial cognizance. The property
may be appropriated by an act of the legislature, or the power of
appropriating it may be delegated to private corporations, to be
exercised by them in the execution of works in which the public is
interested. 3D
money toward the ultimate creation of a state park at Fort Trumbull." Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
29. Matthew P. Harrington, 'Public Use' and the Original Understanding of the
So-Called 'Takings' Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1249 (2002).
The exact origins of the power of eminent domain remain something of a
mystery. Some claim that the earliest exercise of the power to expropriate
land for public use occurred when Israel's King Ahab took Naboth's vineyard,
while others argue that the power has been in use "since the days of the Ro
mans." Regardless of the date of its first use, however, the term, "eminent
domain," (dominium eminens), appears to have been coined by Hugo Grotius
in 1625, in his work, De Jure Belli et Pads. According to Grotius,
the property of subjects belongs to the state under the right of eminent
domain; in consequence the state, or he who represents the state, can use
the property of subjects, and even destroy it or alienate it, not only in case
of direct need, which grants even to private citizens a measure of right
over others' property, but also for the sake of the public advantage; and
to the public advantage those very persons who formed the body politic
should be considered as desiring that private advantage should yield. But,
we must add, when this happens, the state is bound to make good at pub
lic expense the damage to those who lose their property.
Id. at 1249-50 (citations omitted).
30. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878); see also United States v. Get
tysburg & Elec. R.R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896) (It is "not necessary that the power
of condemnation for such purpose be expressly given by the Constitution. The right to
condemn at all is not so given. It results from the powers that are given, and it is
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Public projects are planned with significant public input. Local
officials work to implement those plans by a voluntary sale and typ
ically only use eminent domain as a tool of last resort. This occurs
most often when an owner will not sell or insists on receiving more
than the fair market value for the property31 and:
The eminent domain power is necessary to cure what is itself a
political problem-the capacity of individual private property
holders to frustrate majority will by refusing to sell privately held
land for public purposes. In theory, publicly interested officials
will use the condemnation power only to solve what is called the
"land assembly" problem and only to do so where the result is to
confer net benefits on their constituents, that is, only to make
residents as a whole better off, even though some of those re
sidents will lose private property that they might have preferred
to retain. 32

The procedural mechanics of eminent domain vary among the
different governmental entities that have the power to exercise it.
Ordinarily, the process involves at least three steps: first, the prop
erty that is taken must be identified, the owners must be notified,
and a public plan must be prepared;33 second, the acquisition of the
implied because of its necessity, or because it is appropriate in exercising those pow
ers."). But cf Harrington, supra note 29, at 1248 ("[T]he so-called 'public use' limita
tion on takings is a contrivance of relatively recent origin. In using the term 'public use'
in the Fifth Amendment, the drafters did not intend to impose a substantive limit on
congressional expropriations. Rather, they intended to distinguish a certain type of tak
ing which required compensation (expropriations) from those which did not (taxes and
forfeitures). In essence, the drafters merely intended to ensure that compensation was
given when a citizen was called upon to contribute more than his fair share to support
the government. Thus, takings by expropriation required compensation, while takings
by taxation would not. To reiterate, if read properly, the expropriation clause of the
Fifth Amendment is nothing more than a compensation clause. Consequently, efforts
to use the term 'public use' to limit the power of Congress to expropriate land are
illegitimate and are a misreading of the drafters' intent.").
31. The "holdout problem," as it is known, seems to occur most often where sev
eral parcels have to be assembled in order to successfully implement a project. Human
motivation is a fusion of factors. There can be many reasons a person does not want to
sell. In the eminent domain context, two reasons seem to predominate. First, a person
may be emotionally attached to the property for a variety of legitimate reasons, such as
long-time family ownership of the property. Second, a person may be using the public
need for the property to extract a higher price than the fair market value for the prop
erty. It can be difficult to assess the owner's true motivation for refusing to sell. In
some cases, a genuine emotional attachment to the property may be a guise for leverag
ing a higher price from the public. In others, a demand of an exorbitant price for prop
erty can be a garbled expression of deep emotional attachment to the property. See
also infra note 51.
32. Gillette, supra note 27, at 14-15.
33. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 5C (2004).
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private property must be expressly authorized by a vote of the pub
lic's governing body;34 and finally, some provision must be made
generally by a specific appropriation-.to compensate the owner35
and an appropriate appellate process must be provided. 36 To put
together the land needed to implement the publicly authorized de
velopment plan and create the conditions needed to restore the
Fort Trumbull peninsula to economic prosperity, New London had
to use eminent domain. Of course, the exercise of eminent domain
to take private property from owners who are unwilling to part with
it can become controversial and be vigorously opposed. Kelo was
just such a case.
2.

New London's Use of Eminent Domain

In Connecticut, a local government's power of eminent do
main37 can be delegated. This is expressly authorized by state law
under which the innumerable tasks required to implement an eco
nomic-development project can be delegated to a private, non
profit economic-development corporation. 38 New London exer
cised this authority and selected the New London Development
Corporation (NLDC)39 as its agent to plan, design, and implement
the economic revitalization. Thereafter, the following significant
events in the economic revitalization process took place:
"In April, 1998, the New London city council gave initial ap
proval to prepare a development plan for the Fort Trumbull area
and the [development corporation] began holding informal
neighborhood meetings regarding the [development plan] pro
cess. In May, 1998, the city council authorized [the development
corporation] to proceed under chapters 130, 132 and/or 588 (I) of
the [General] Statutes.
34. See, e.g, id. § 1.
35. See, e.g, id. § 6.
36. See, e.g., id. §§ 14, 18.
37. See CONN. CaNST. art. I, § 11 ("The property of no person shall be taken for
public use, without just compensation therefor.").
38. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-188 (2006) (providing that "[a]ny municipality ... is
authorized, by vote of its legislative body, to designate ... a nonprofit development
corporation as its development agency and exercise through such agency the powers
granted under this chapter"); see also Kelo v. City of New London (Keto 1/), 843 A.2d
500, 513-15 nn.15-19 (Conn. 2004), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
39. The NLDC is a private, non-profit, Connecticut economic-development cor
poration. New London Corp. Dev., About Us, http://www.nldc.org/aboutus/nldc_org
.hlm (last visited Dec. 26, 2006).
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"The state bond commission approved more funds 40 for [the
development corporation] activity. In June, 1998, the city for
mally conveyed the New London Mills site to Pfizer. In July,
1998, a consulting team was appointed for the state Environmen
tal Protection Act process and to prepare the [development
plan]. Six alternative plans for the project area were considered
as part of the required environmental impact evaluation. "41

The development plan that ultimately emerged from this pro
cess was approved by the NLDC, the Cii.y of New London, and the
State of Connecticut. 42 The goals of the approved plan were to cre
ate "a development that would complement the facility that Pfizer
was planning to build, create jobs, increase tax and other revenues,
encourage public access to and use of the city's waterfront, and
eventually 'build momentum' for the revitalization of the rest of the
city, including its downtown area. "43
Under the approved plan, the 115 separate parcels and the for
mer Naval Undersea Warfare Center site 44 were all to be acquired
and consolidated into seven major development parcels,45 each de
40. The state bond commission had already authorized bonds in January 1998.
See supra note 28.
41. Keto II, 843 A.2d at 508-09 (quoting the trial record).
42. The Connecticut Departments of Economic and Community Development
and Environmental Protection, the Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, and
the Southeastern Connecticut Council of Governments also approved the development
plan. Id. at 510 n.8.
43. [d. at 509.
44. Although the NUWC site contained a total of thirty-two acres, eighteen of
those acres were carved out from the rest and sold to the State of Connecticut to be
come the site of the Fort Trumbull State Park. Kelo v. City of New London (Keto III),
125 S. Ct. 2655, 2659 (2005).
45. "The development plan itself is divided into seven parcels of land." Keto II,
843 A.2d at 509.
Parcell will include a waterfront hotel and conference center, along with ma
rinas for both transient tourist boaters, and commercial fishing vessels. Parcel
1 also will include a public walkway along the waterfront. Parcel 2 will pro
vide for approximately eighty new residences, organized into an urban neigh
borhood and linked by public walkway to the remainder of the development
plan, including the Fort Trumbull State Park. Space will be reserved at the
southern end of parcel 2 for the United States Coast Guard Museum (mu
seum), which will be moved to the development plan area from the nearby
United States Coast Guard Academy.
Parcel 3 is projected to have at least 90,000 square feet of high technology
research and development office space and parking. This office space would
be located close to other research and development facilities, including those
of Pfizer. The location of parcel 3 allows for direct vehicular access to the
development therein, obviating the need for that traffic to pass through the
rest of the development area. Parcel 3 also will retain the existing Italian Dra
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signed to maximize the economic potential of its unique design and
precise geographic location. The seven new development parcels
would function in a complementary manner to make the sum
greater than its parts. 46 The approved development plan was a pub
lic one, designed to ensure the long-term prosperity of New
London. The approved plan would remain in effect for ninety-nine
years. During that period of time, the NLDC would lease the seven
newly configured parcels for a nominal rent to a private developer.
The private developer would invest the majority of private capital
needed to build and market the structures in accordance with the
approved development plan. At the end of ninety-nine years, New
London would resume complete control over the seven fully devel
oped parcels. New London could then decide what to do with the
parcels. 47
Though complex, the plan had the potential, if properly imp le
matic Club, a private social organization with its own building. Four proper
ties owned by three of the plaintiffs are located on parcel 3.
Parcel 4 is subdivided into two smaller parcels, 4A and 4B. Parcel 4A is
designated for "park support"; it will provide parking or retail services for the
adjacent state park. Parcel 4B will include a marina, which will be a renova
tion of an existing marina and include slips for both recreational boating and
commercial fishing operations. The walkway will be continued through these
parcels. Eleven properties owned by four of the plaintiffs are located on par
cel4A.
Parcel 5 also is subdivided into three separate parcels, which cumulatively
will include 140,000 square feet of office space, parking and retail space. Par
cel6 will be developed for a variety of water-dependent commercial uses. Par
cel 7 is small and will be used for additional office or research and
development use.
Id. at 509-10 (citations omitted).
46. The Connecticut Supreme Court declined
to address the plaintiffs' parcel-specific claims in this context because an ap
propriate public use analysis necessarily requires evaluation of the develop
ment plan as a whole-the end result of the sum of all of its parts. [They
would], however, address the plaintiffs' parcel-specific claims in the related
context of reasonable necessity; that is, whether the taking of the plaintiffs'
property was reasonably necessary to achieve the public purpose of the devel
opment plan.
Id. at 537 n.50 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 510.
According to Admiral David Goebel, chief operating officer of the
[NLDC], the [NLDC] will own the land located within the development area.
The [NLDC] will enter into ground leases of various parcels to private devel
opers; those leases will require the developer to comply with the terms of the
development plan. At the time of trial, the [NLDC] was negotiating with Cor
coran Jennison, a developer, with the intention of entering into a ninety-nine
year ground lease of parcels 1, 2 and 3 with the developer. Under the lease,
Corcoran Jennison will pay the [NLDC] rent of $1 per year. Corcoran Jenni
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mented, to restart the Fort Trumbull economic engine and make
New London a vibrant urban community once again. A significant
social cost had to be paid in order to make the most of this golden
opportunity.48 To implement the carefully designed, government
approved,49 thoroughly reviewed, and flexible development plan,so
the NLDC began negotiating a fair price with the owners of the 115
separate parcels. In this manner, the NLDC acquired 100 of the
privately owned parcels. The owners of the remaining fifteen par
cels refused to sell (hereinafter referred to as the "holdout par
cels").sl When New London attempted to take the holdout parcels
by eminent domain, the property owners filed suit in the Connecti
son will actually develop the parcels, a process that includes marketing for and
loca ting tenants.
Id.

48. '''An old New London neighborhood with all of its memories, in effect, has
been destroyed. People like the plaintiffs have been or might yet be removed from
homes they love and in some cases from homes where their families have lived for
generations.'" Id. at 540 n.57 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo I), No.
557299,2002 WL 500238 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002)).
49. Id. at 548 n.n (quoting the New London City Council resolution of January
2000 that, among other things, approved the Fort Trumbull development plan and au
thorized the NLDC to carry it out by exercising all the legal powers permitted under
the Connecticut General Statutes "including the power of eminent domain with[in] the
project area in the name of the City of New London").
50. The New London Development Plan calls for the Fort Trumbull Peninsula to
"be developed as a dynamic mixed-use urban district that fully develops the
opportunities presented by its waterfront location and its adjacency to the de
veloping regional assets of the Fort Trumbull State Park and the Pfizer [g]lobal
[d]evelopment [f]acility. The development of its proposed land uses shall sup
port the formation of a vibrant Waterfront Urban Village, which binds each of
its components into a highly cohesive urban district.
"The integrated nature of the proposed development shall (a) increase
public access and use of the waterfront, (b) maintain a community atmos
phere, and (c) enhance the location's attractiveness and desirability. The es
tablishment of strong functional, spatial and physical interrelationships between
the district's various buildings, streets, public spaces and the waterfront, shall
orient the development of each of the proposed land use components. "
Id. at 574 n.108 (alterations added by the court).
51. The Connecticut Supreme Court quoted the trial court's memorandum of de
cision in order to express this point:
"[E]ach of the plaintiffs testified and said they wished to remain in their
homes for a variety of personal reasons. Two of the people referred to the fact
that their families have lived in their homes for decades. They all testified that
they loved their homes and the Fort Trumbull area. Several have put a lot of
work into their property and all of them appeared ... to be sincerely attached
to their homes. One owner, [Susette] Kelo, loved the view her house afforded
her and the fact that it was close to the water. All testified that they were not
opposed to new development in the Fort Trumbull area. Also, two of the
plaintiffs own their property as business investments-the rental of apart
ments. These two people have put much time, money and effort into renovat
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cut Superior Court seeking a permanent injunction preventing the
taking. The Kelo case was underway.
II.

A.

THE LAW IN CONNECTICUT

The State Superior Court Decision

"After a seven-day bench trial, the [Superior C]ourt granted
permanent injunctive relief to, and dismissed the pending eminent
domain actions against, the four plaintiffs who live[d] on parcel 4A
of the development plan. The court, however, upheld the takings of
the parcel 3 properties. "52 Both sides appealed the decision. With
respect to the ultimate federal constitutional issue, the following
facts 53 found by the trial judge are important: 54
The ... development plan, which is a composite of the most
beneficial features of six alternate development plans ... consid
ered, would have a significant socioeconomic impact on the New
London region. The development plan is expected to generate
approximately between: (1) 518 and 867 construction jobs; (2)
718 and 1362 direct jobs; and (3) 500 and 940 indirect jobs. The
composite parcels of the development plan also are expected to
generate between $680,544 and $1,249,843 in property tax reve
ing their properties, one has owned his property for seventeen years, the other
for about eight years."
Id. at 511 (quoting Kelo I, 2002 WL 500238, at *3).
52. Id. (citation omitted).
53. The Connecticut Superior Court decision, written by Judge Corradino, was
not officially reported; however, it is available through Westlaw. Kelo v. City of New
London (Kelo I), No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002). The
Connecticut Supreme Court adopted the "background facts and procedural history ...
aptly set forth in the trial court's comprehensive memorandum of decision." Kelo II,
843 A.2d at 508.
54. The proper role for fact finding in constitutional litigation "remains adrift in
an epistemological fog." David Faigman, Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases, in How
LAW KNOWS 156 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2006). In cases such as Kelo, where the appel
late courts did not hear live testimony or watch the witnesses testify, they will not have
the same institutional opportunity as the trial court to assess witness credibility, deter
mine witness veracity, and measure the weight to be given to oral testimony. Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 701 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("An appellate court
never has the benefit of the [trial] court's intimate familiarity with the details of the
case-nor the full benefit of its hearing of the live testimony ...."). For these reasons,
the trial court's findings of fact are characteristically considered conclusive and ordina
rily will not be disturbed on appeal. In Kelo, the facts found by the trial court were not
successfully challenged. Consequently, they are the facts of the case for purposes of
appellate review. This means that when appellate courts review the issues on appeal,
the only facts they can reliably use to decide the Kelo appeal are those facts found by
the New London Superior Court trial judge. See id. at 702 (quoting Commissioner v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960».
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nues for the city, in which 54 percent of the land area is exempt
from property taxes. These gains would occur in a city that, with
the exception of the new Pfizer facility adjacent to the develop
ment plan area that now employs approximately 2000 people, re
cently has experienced serious employment declines, particularly
with the loss of approximately 1900 government sector positions,
and the closure of the United States Naval Undersea Warfare
Center in 1996, which transferred more than 1000 positions to
Newport, Rhode Island. Indeed, the state office of policy and
management has designated the city a "distressed
m unici pali ty. "55

These are the key facts in the case upon which the constitutional
issues revolve.

B.

The State Supreme Court Decision

Most state constitutions use the same two-word phrase-"pub
lic use"-in their legal framework governing eminent domain tak
ings. 56 The Connecticut Constitution authorizes eminent domain
taking in substantially the same words as the "Takings Clause" of
the Fifth Amendment.57 In deciding the Kelo appeal, the Connecti
cut Supreme Court engaged in a full and thorough review of the
55. Kelo ll, 843 A.2d at 510 (citations omitted).
56. See, e.g., CaNN. CaNST. art. I, § 11 ("The property of no person shall be taken
for public use, without just compensation therefor."); MASS. CaNST. pt. 1, art. 10 ("[N]o
part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to
public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the peo
ple.... And whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual
should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation
therefor."); N.Y. CaNST. art. I, § 7 ("Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. "). There are only six states that do not use the phrase "pub
lic use" in their constitutions, but two of those states do use the phrase "public pur
pose." FLA. CaNST. art. X, § 6 ("No private property shall be taken except for a public
purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit
in the registry of the court and available to the owner."); LA. CaNST. art. 1, § 4(b)
("Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions except
for public purposes. "). The constitutions of Georgia and Indiana allow a taking for any
use. See GA. CaNST. art. IX, § 2, pt. VII ("The General Assembly may authorize any
county, municipality, or housing authority to undertake and carry out community rede
velopment, which may include the sale or other disposition of property acquired by
eminent domain to private enterprise for private uses."); IND. CaNST. art. I, § 21 ("No
person's property shall be taken by law, without just compensation; nor, except in case
of the State, without such compensation first assessed and tendered."). Note, however,
that an amendment to Georgia's constitution has been proposed which incorporates the
"public use" concept. See 2006 GA. LAWS 1111 ("The power of eminent domain shall
not be used for redevelopment purposes by any entity, except for public use, as defined
by general law.").
57. Compare U.S. CaNST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for
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applicable Connecticut law on the public-use issue. It then deter
mined, based upon the facts found by the Superior Court and its
own analysis of the applicable law, that the eminent domain takings
of the fifteen holdout parcels were all for a public use and therefore
lawful.58
In deciding the appeal from the Connecticut Superior Court in
Kelo, the Connecticut Supreme Court rendered its final judgment
upon the law, concluding that "economic development projects cre
ated and implemented pursuant to chapter 132 that have the public
economic benefits of creating new jobs, increasing tax and other
revenues, and contributing to urban revitalization, satisfy the pub
lic-use clauses of the state and federal constitutions."59 For pur
poses of the public-use issue, the most significant part of the
Connecticut Supreme Court's decision is its recognition that Con
necticut law "authorizes the use of eminent domain for private eco
nomic development."6o The Connecticut legislature specifically
found "that the economic welfare of the state depends upon the
continued growth of industry and business within the state" and
that acquiring and improving
"unified land and water areas and vacated commercial plants to
meet the needs of industry and business should be in accordance
with local, regional and state planning objectives; that such acqui
sition and improvement often cannot be accomplished through
the ordinary operations of private enterprise at competitive rates
of progress and economies of cost; that permitting and assisting
municipalities to acquire and improve ... [such areas] are public
uses and purposes for which public moneys may be expended;
and that the necessity in the public interest for the provisions of
this chapter is hereby declared as a matter of legislative
determination. "61

The New London City Council authorized the NLDC to ac
quire all the holdout parcels by eminent domain. 62 The entire pro
cess was authorized and implemented according to Connecticut
state law. Years before the eminent domain takings in the Kelo
public use, without just compensation"), with CONN. CaNST. art. I, § 11 ("The property
of no person shall be taken for public use, without just compensation therefor.").
58. Keto II, 843 A.2d at 520.
59. Id. (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 521.
61. Id. at 512-13 n.13, 520 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 (2000)) (emphasis
omitted).
62. Kelo v. City of New London (Keto III), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2659 (2005).
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case, the Connecticut legislature determined that this type of revi
talization activity is in the public's interest. 63 The public policy of
Connecticut authorizes distressed municipalities to take private
property, by eminent domain, for economic-development purposes
under an approved plan. Such acquisitions were declared to be a
public use and a purpose "for which public moneys may be ex
pended."64 The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld that state legis
lative determination. 65 The executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the state government agreed: Economic development is
a valid public use for which private property can be taken under the
governmental power of eminent domain in Connecticut. 66
In addition to analyzing, discussing, and deciding all the state
law issues, the Connecticut Supreme Court also opined about the
federal constitutionality of the Kelo taking. 67 On that issue, the
United States Supreme Court is the final authority.68 The Kelo
plaintiffs petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari,
and their petition was granted. 69
63.

Kelo /1,843 A.2d at 512-13.

64.
65.

[d. at 513.
[d. at 519.

66. In the Connecticut courts, the Kelo plaintiffs challenged the constitutional va
lidity of the delegation by New London of its eminent domain power to the NLDC. [d.
at 547. The Connecticut Supreme Court agreed with the position taken by New
London and the NLDC that "the delegation in the present case is constitutionally valid
because the development corporation is the city's statutorily authorized agent for the
implementation of the development plan, a constitutionally valid public purpose, and is
not acting to further its own operations." [d. at 547.
67. See id. at 519, 528.
68. "This great principle is, that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance
thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective states,
and cannot be controlled by them." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
426 (1819).
69. The Supreme Court is a court that primarily exercises appellate jurisdiction.
It does not regularly conduct formal fact finding proceedings, but it has the authority to
do so. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. "Relatively few original jurisdiction cases come to the
Court. In recent times there have been one or two a year. The Court's practice in these
cases is to appoint a 'Master' to hear the evidence, determine facts, and recommend a
decision." Thomas R. Bruce, Original Jurisdiction, Legal Info. Inst., Cornell Law
School, WEX (2005), http://WWW.law.comell.edu/wex/index.PhP/originaljurisdiction
(lastvisitedDec.26.2006);SeealsoDAVIDM.O.BRIEN.II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS 100 (4th ed. 2000) ("The Supreme Court is the only federal court in the
United States to have complete power to decide what to decide, that is, which cases to
hear. This power enables the Court to set its own agenda as welI as to manage its
docket. Like other courts, the Supreme Court, however, must await issues brought by
lawsuits; it does not initiate its own. Also, like other social institutions, it is affected by
social change .... The Court now functions like a roving commission in responding to
social forces. ").
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THE CORE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE

Application of the Fifth Amendment to the States

The nucleus of the federal constitutional controversy in Kelo 70
is the phrase "public use" in the Fifth Amendment. These words
have been a part of the Federal Constitution since the Bill of Rights
was adopted in 1791, but for decades, it only applied to the federal
government, not to state and local governments.71 The Founding
Fathers clearly understood that the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment did not apply to any eminent domain taking made by
any state or local government. Chief Justice Marshall explained the
reasons for this, stating:
The constitution was ordained and established by the people
of the United States for themselves, for their own government,
and not for the government of the individual states. Each state
established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, pro
vided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its partic
ular government as its judgment dictated. The people of the
United States framed such a government for the United States as
they supposed best adapted to their situation, and best calculated
to promote their interests. The powers they conferred on this
government were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on
power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, we think,
necessarily applicable to the government created by the instru
ment. They are limitations of power granted in the instrument
itself; not of distinct governments, framed by different persons
and for different purposes.
If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must
be understood as restraining the power of the general govern
ment, not as applicable to the states. In their several constitu
tions they have imposed such restrictions on their respective
governments as their own wisdom suggested; such as they
deemed most proper for themselves. It is a subject on which they
judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no farther than
they are supposed to have a common interest. 72
70. Misinformation about the Kelo decision was widely disseminated after the
Supreme Court issued its decision. It aroused an "unjustified fear that all homes may
be now suddenly at risk of seizure by Big Brother." John McIlwain, A Primer on Kelo
v. New London; Eminent Domain on a Slippery Slope (Aug. 26, 2005), URB. LAND
INST., http://www .uli.org/ AM/Template.cfm ?Section=search& template=/CM/HTML
Display.cfm&ContentID=33971.
71. Kelo /I, 843 A.2d at 519, 519 n.27; see Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S.
(1 Pet.) 243 (1833).
72. Barron, 32 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 247-48.
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When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, its
Due Process Clause was binding upon the states. 73 Thereafter, the
Supreme Court began incorporating select provisions of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirement:
Although some members of the Supreme Court have
deemed the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the Bill of
Rights (actually, the first eight amendments) in its totality, a ma
jority of the Supreme Court has never adopted this view and has,
in fact, specifically rejected it, stating that the Fourteenth
Amendment was not a shorthand incorporation of the first eight
amendments.7 4

The "incorporation" process has proceeded on a case-by-case
basis. It was not until the latter part of the nineteenth century that
the Court incorporated the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause into
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, thereby making
it applicable to state and local governmental takings of private
property.75 Thus, any original intent7 6 investigation into the mean
ing of the Takings Clause necessarily
requires a full analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment, how it was
framed, the meaning of its phraseology, and its parlous course in
the legislatures and the courts from 1868 to our own day. Analy
sis must consider also the renewed fusion of Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence and federal review with eminent domain and tak
ings questions in the states. Attention to this interesting history
will, if nothing else, serve as a salutary reminder of how constitu
73. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§l.

74. 16 AM. lUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 404 (1998) (citations omitted).
75. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897)
(citations omitted).
76. Those who oppose the concept of "incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment" should remember
that the first of the Bill of Rights limitations to be swept in and applied to the
states through incorporation by the Supreme Court, nearly a century ago, was
not a search and seizure, church-state, free speech, or right to counselor some
other criminal matter but a good sound property question: none other than the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Harry N. Scheiber, The "Takings" Clause and the Fifth Amendment: Original Intent and
Significance in American Legal Development, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL
MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 233, 243 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed. 1991)
(citation omitted).
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tional change has its ironies and its challenges to lawyers who pay
lip service, at least, to consistency of doctrine.7 7

Two years before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted,
the Connecticut Supreme Court began taking "a flexible approach"
to construing the public-use clause in the Connecticut Constitu
tion.7 8 After 1897, all eminent domain takings had to meet the min
imum requirements expressed in the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment due process.79 Thus, a
federalism issue arose in Kelo. What, if any, constitutional weight
should be afforded to the laws and decisions which were in effect or
decided prior to the time the Fifth Amendment became applicable
to the states?
New London's taking of the Fort Trumbull property was cho
sen for review by the Supreme Court so the Court could decide
whether economic development is a public use for which private
property may be taken under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The Supreme Court faced a difficult question: should
the Court ignore the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision on that
same issue. The issue is significant because the phrase "public use"
is found in both the United States and Connecticut constitutions.
The Connecticut Supreme Court based its decision upon a state
precedent adopted in 1866, a time when the Fifth Amendment Tak
ings Clause was inapplicable to state eminent domain proceedings.
The Connecticut decision was founded upon a modern declaration
of public policy by the Connecticut legislature and consistent with
Supreme Court precedents. 8o
77. Id.
78. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo II), 843 A.2d 500, 522 (Conn. 2004) (citing
Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (1866), which established "the foundation for our
deferential approach to legislative declarations of public use"). Olmstead v. Camp also
answered the question, '''what [ ] is the limit of the legislative power under the clause
which we have been considering, and what is the exact line between public and private
uses?'" by stating that" 'there can be no precise line. The power requires a degree of
elasticity to be capable ofmeeting new conditions and improvements and the ever increas
ing necessities ofsociety. The sole dependence must be on the presumed wisdom of the
sovereign authority, supervised, and in cases of gross error or extreme wrong, con
trolled, by the dispassionate judgment of the courts.'" Id. at 523 (quoting Olmstead v.
Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 551 (1866)) (emphasis by the court).
79. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. 226.
80. See, e.g., Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain's Po
litical Philosophies Post- Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 282 (2006) ("[P]prior to
Kelo's arrival, the narrow interpretation [that had been applied to the public use defini
tion in the nineteenth century] vanished and the definition of public use had again in
flated to include incidental public benefits that appear rather remote from
unquestionably public-minded undertakings such as schools or public roads. Similarly,
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The Ambiguous Takings Clause

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensa
tion."81 The clause "has been interpreted to mean that the govern
ment can take private property only for a public use and if it pays
the owners just compensation. "82 Construing the Takings Clause in
this way83 provides some measure of constitutional protection
against arbitrary government property seizures:
These two limitations serve to protect "the security of Prop
erty," which Alexander Hamilton described to the Philadelphia
Convention as one of the "great obj[ects] of Gov[ernment]." To
gether they ensure stable property ownership by providing safe
guards against excessive, unpredictable, or unfair use of the
government's eminent domain power-particularly against those
owners who, for whatever reasons, may be unable to protect
themselves in the political process against the majority's wil1. 84
It gives constitutional protection to an idea that has been said

to be "founded in natural equity" and recognized as a "principle of
universal law."85 Construing the Takings Clause in this sensible
manner, however, does not free the clause of ambiguity. The Kelo
the deference afforded legislative determinations of public use has increased over
time.").
81. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
82. Thomas W. Merrill, The Goods, the Bads, and the Ugly, LEGAL AFF., Jan.!
Feb. 2005, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2005/toa_
merrill..Janfeb05.msp; see also Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo Ill), 125 S. Ct. 2655,
2672 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have read the Fifth Amendment's lan
guage to impose two distinct conditions on the exercise of eminent domain: the taking
must be for a 'public use' and 'just compensation' must be paid to the owner." (citation
and internal quotations omitted».
83. There are other possible interpretations of the takings clause.
The phrase "for public use" qualifies the word "taken," but only as a de
scriptive qualifier-it is not, at least not on the face of it, a limitation, self
enforcing or otherwise. Earlier colonial charters of liberties had used the
phrase "pressed or taken for any public use or service," and the like; it was
tautological, as it were, that if government took property it was for public
use.... [I]n the hands of nineteenth-century judges the concept of "public
use" quickly became a limitation-for these judges interpreted it as a limiting
concept derived from natural and civil law.
Scheiber, supra note 76, at 235 (citation omitted); see also Harrington, supra note 29, at
1249 ("[T]he term 'public use' as used in the Fifth Amendment was meant to be de
scriptive, rather than proscriptive, and [] the term was not intended to operate as a
substantive limitation on Congress' power to expropriate property.").
84. Kelo Ill, 125 S. Ct. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
85. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897).
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case concerns a controversy over the "public use" phrase in the
Takings Clause.
The Constitution is not a dictionary. It does not define "public
use." What that phrase means depends upon who defines it. 86 The
Constitution is not a word game ruled by "some sort of nine-headed
Caesar, giving thumbs-up or thumbs-down to whatever outcome,
case by case, suits or offends its collective fancy."87 As Justice Ste
vens, writing for the majority in Kelo, pointed out,
"[the] Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that con
demned property be put into use for the general public." Indeed,
while many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed "use by
the public" as the proper definition of public use, that narrow
view steadily eroded over time. Not only was the "use by the
public" test difficult to administer (e.g., what proportion of the
public need have access to the property? at what price?), but it
proved to be impractical given the diverse and always evolving
needs of society. Accordingly, when this Court began applying
the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th cen
tury, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of
public use as "public purpose."88

The key aspect of the Court's opinion in Kelo was its decision
about who should define the phrase "public use" for purposes of
the economic-development project in New London. The issue is
constitutionally significant because of the separation of powers.
86. There has been a lot of discussion regarding the proper definition of "public
use" under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. When courts define the phrase
they tend to define it broadly or narrowly depending upon the views of the judge mak
ing the decision. Whether actual public use is required or whether a public benefit is
sufficient are just two of the many issues that arise from following this approach to the
public use issue. "Interpreting the Constitution ... presupposes a judicial and political
philosophy and poses inescapable questions of substantive value choices." O'BRIEN,
supra note 69, at 87, 94. Applying great deference to resolve the public-use issue en
ables the Court to avoid becoming enmeshed in this philosophical and linguistic wres
tling match.
87. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 454 (2000) (Scalia, I., dissenting).
88. Keto Ill, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 (citations omitted); cf id. at 2679 (Thomas, I.,
dissenting) ("The most natural reading of the Clause is that it allows the government to
take property only if the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the
property, as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or necessity whatsoever. At
the time of the founding, dictionaries primarily defined the noun 'use' as '[t]he act of
employing any thing to any purpose.' The term 'use,' moreover, 'is from the Latin utar,
which means 'to use, make use of, avail one's self of, employ, apply, enjoy, etc.' ... The
term 'public use,' then, means that either the government or its citizens as a whole must
actually 'employ' the taken property. Granted, another sense of the word 'use' was
broader in meaning, extending to '[c]onvenience' or 'help,' or '[qjualities that make a
thing proper for any purpose.'" (citations omitted».
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The crux of the constitutional controversy in Kelo was as much po
litical as it was legal:
Constitutional interpretation and law, Justice Felix Frankfurter
observed, "is not at all a science, but applied politics." The Con
stitution, of course, is a political document and as a written docu
ment is not self-interpreting; its interpretation is political. How
the Constitution should be interpreted is thus as controversial as
the ongoing debate over who should interpret it. 89

The resolution of the political conflict is for the legislature not
the courts. The judiciary should limit its involvement in the conflict
to measuring whether the legislature's political decision is inher
ently incompatible with the basic "public use" in the Fifth Amend
ment. The wisdom of the legislative decision on that political
question can be judged by the People when they vote. This is the
design of our Constitution.
C.

The Roles of the Legislature and the Judiciary in Eminent
Domain Law

The American people have an abiding allegiance to the United
States Constitution. To minimize the potential for governmental
tyranny, the Constitution aims to separate all government power
into three co-equal branches. 90 The legislative branch makes the
89. O'BRIEN, supra note 69, at 69 (citation omitted).
90. Steve Mount, Constitutional Topic: Separation of Powers, http://www.usconsti
tution.net/consttop_sepp.html (last visited on Dec. 26, 2006).
The Separation of Powers devised by the framers of the Constitution was
designed to do one primary thing: to prevent the majority from ruling with an
iron fist. Based on their experience, the framers shied away from giving any
branch of the new government too much power. The separation of powers
provides a system of shared power known as Checks and Balances.
Three branches are created in the Constitution. The Legislative, com
posed of the House and Senate, is set up in Article 1. The Executive, com
posed of the President, Vice-President, and the Departments, is set up in
Article 2. The Judicial, composed of the federal courts and the Supreme
Court, is set up in Article 3.
Each of these branches has certain powers, and each of these powers is
limited, or checked, by another branch.
All of these checks and balances, however, are inefficient. But that's by
design rather than by accident. By forcing the various branches to be account
able to the others, no one branch can usurp enough power to become
dominant.
Id.; see also James Kent, Introductory Law School Lecture in 1794, reprinted in
O'BRIEN, supra note 69, at 39, 41 (citation omitted) (observing at that early date that
"[i]t is regarded also as an undisputed principle in American Politics, that the different
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laws. The executive branch executes the laws. The courts of the
judicial branch resolve disputes about the interpretation of laws.
The public-use question is a constitutional crossroad where legisla
tive power and judicial power intersect. Should the courts or the
legislature determine which public uses are important enough to al
low the government to take private property by eminent domain?91
Both branches have a legitimate role to play in deciding the issue.
The legislature expresses society's concerns about the commu
nity. Legislators represent their constituents by initiating, consider
ing, and enacting laws. This process takes place in public meetings
and hearings during which information is obtained from several
sources. Public policy questions are discussed, debated, and voted
on by the legislature. They are regularly reported in the media.
The legislative process is well suited for determining how society
should address its most pressing and important problems. The leg
islature makes laws and appropriates public funds to solve those
problems.
With respect to eminent domain takings, the Constitution re
quires the government to pay just compensation. That payment is
made with public funds that the legislature appropriates. The legis
lature should decide which public uses of private property justify a
taking by eminent domain. Arguably, this is what the Framers orig
inally intended.92 When a law is not constitutionally prohibited and
is designed to achieve any of the goals within the purview of the
government, the courts should not "inquire into the degree of its
necessity" because doing so crosses the constitutional line drawn to
separate the judicial branch from the legislative branch. 93
departments of Government should be kept as far as possible separate and distinct" and
pointing out that changing "this natural distribution of power" would tend "to overturn
the balance of the Government, and to introduce Tyranny into the Administration").
91. While courts have the power to review decisions of the legislature, they may
properly decline to do so for several reasons. For example,
Even when the Court has jurisdiction over a properly framed suit, it may
decline to rule because it decides that a case raises a "political question" that
should be resolved by other political branches. Like other jurisdictional doc
trines, the political question doctrine means what the justices say it means.
. . . . Litigation that reaches the Court is political, and the justices for
political reasons decide what and how to decide cases on their docket.
O'BRIEN, supra note 69, at 118-19.
92. "[I]f read properly, the expropriation clause of the Fifth Amendment is noth
ing more than a compensation clause. Consequently, efforts to use the term 'public use'
to limit the power of Congress to expropriate land are illegitimate and are a misreading
of the drafters' intent." Harrington, supra note 29, at 1248.
93. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
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The Supreme Court is generally recognized as the final author
ity on what the Constitution means. 94 As the governmental body
that applies the rule of law to particular cases, it must, therefore,
"expound and interpret that rule."95 The public-use issue in Kelo
can be seen in this context-a dispute between an individual's right
to private property96 and the public's need for economic prosperity.
The judicial decision in Kelo was a difficult one for the trial judge
because:
Really what is involved is conflicting dreams. The plaintiffs wish
to live out the typical American dream of abiding and owning in
peace homes and property that they have chosen. Any threat to
that dream is understandably forcefully and emotionally opposed
as it should be in a free society. In fact, they are to be respected
because whether their position is agreed with or not their very
struggle reinforced shared values in our society.
On the other side of this controversy are what may be con
sidered abstract entities-the City of New London, the New
London Redevelopment Agency. But the people behind these
abstractions have a dream also. The accomplishment of their
dream presents no opportunity of personal gain or favor. Their
dream is for their city buffeted for decades by hard times and
until recently declining prospects. They hope by this develop
ment project and resistance to the plaintiffs' litigation to provide
an economic and social uplift for their city-jobs that will pro
vide the underemployed or unemployed new hope, new tax mon
ies so the tax burden on the community can be lifted and new

94. There are some members of the legal community who challenge "the histori
cal pedigree of the doctrine of judicial supremacy" and "advocate the rival-and until
recently almost forgotten-doctrine of 'popular constitutionalism.' This is the idea that
the highest authority for interpreting the Constitution is not the Supreme Court, but the
American people." Richard A. Posner, The People's Court, reviewing Larry D.
Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, in THE
NEW REPUBLIC, July 19, 2004.
95. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
96. W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 532 (1848).
Under every established government, the tenure of property is derived
mediately or immediately from the sovereign power of the political body, or
ganized in such mode or exerted in such way as the community or state may
have thought proper to ordain. It can rest on no other foundation, can have
no other guarantee. It is owing to these characteristics only, in the original
nature of tenure, that appeals can be made to the laws either for the protec
tion or assertion of the rights of property. Upon any other hypothesis, the law
of property would be simply the law of force.
[d.
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programs and projects for the city that can be realized. 97
The judiciary has the constitutional responsibility for resolving
such conflicts.98 When attempting to find the just balance between
these conflicting goals, the judiciary "must never forget, that it is a
constitution [it is] expounding,"99 one which was "intended to en
dure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the vari
ous crises of human affairs. "100 In more recent times, the Court has
observed:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the
components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might
have been more specific. They did not presume to have this in
sight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper
in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, per
sons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own
search for greater freedom.lOi
Resolving constitutional conflicts over the public-use issue in
eminent domain is best done when the resolution preserves and re
spects the separation of power between the legislative and judicial
branches of government and, at the same time, ensures that every
individual gets all the rights constitutionally due him. The individ
ual's constitutionally protected right to due process of law in an em
inent domain proceeding is two-fold: the property must be taken
for a valid public use; and if it is, then just compensation must be
paid to the owner.1°2 The just-compensation issue was not ad
dressed in Kelo and it will not be discussed here. The Kelo plain
tiffs sought to have the takings invalidated and argued, "that the
97. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo I), No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002).
98. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 ("It is emphatically the province ... of the
judicial department to say what the law is."); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 549 (1969) ("Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion
interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the docu
ment by another branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause can
not justify the courts' avoiding their constitutional responsibility.") (citations omitted).
99. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis
provided).
100. Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
101. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
102. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231 (2003). But see Scheiber,
supra note 76, at 235 (The "phrase 'for public use' qualifies the word 'taken,' but only
as a descriptive qualifier-it is not, at least on the face of it, a limitation, self-enforcing
or otherwise.").
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issue of fair compensation does not even arise."103 They wanted to
keep their property "since no amount of compensation can be a
constitutional substitute for the right of the citizen to remain in his
or her home or business free of governmental trespass on that
right."l04 Consequently, the key constitutional question in Kelo in
volved the public-use issue. The issue was resolved by the deferen
tial judicial review of public-use determinations.

D.

The Importance of Deferential Judicial Review

The great accommodation is made by the judicial branch en
gaging in a deferential review of the public-use issue. The doctrine
of judicial review J05 makes the judiciary the final authority on legal
disputes among governmental departments. The courts have de
vised a range of analytical techniques to help decide the legality of
disputed government actions. The key characteristic of the judicial
review standards is that they are generally outcome determinative.
They range from deferential to activist and have been differentiated
as follows:
Deferential standards of judicial review are characterized by
a judicial tendency toward accepting the determination of the
governmental entity whose conduct is being examined. Govern
mental conduct will be upheld if it is in pursuit of "legitimate"
governmental objectives and the government has used means to
103. Kelo 1,2002 WL 500238, at *l.
104. Id. at *26.
105. Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States
in the Supreme Court. The Constitution does not specify how the Court should exer
cise its power. The Supreme Court resolved that issue by deciding the Constitution was
the fundamental law and took upon itself the power "to say what the law is." Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future govern
ment, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own
happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has been
erected....

Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate
them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and conse
quently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legis
lature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the
courts must decide on the operation of each.
/d. The power to review the actions of the other branches of the government is known
as the doctrine of judicial review.
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achieve the objectives that are "rational," in that they are reason
ably likely to achieve the ends ....
Activist standards of judicial review, in contrast, are charac
terized by a judicial tendency to second-guess the governmental
entity involved, and to uphold the government action only if the
government is able to demonstrate it is advancing what are
termed "important" or "compelling" governmental objectives .
. . . Under activist judicial review, the burden of proof is on
the government to demonstrate a compelling state interest and
that the means used are necessary to achieve that interest. More
over, the government also must demonstrate that there are no
other alternative means that are less restrictive of the right

106

Deferential judicial review of the public-use issue is important.
It allows legislative input into the issue of "who decides," thereby

respecting the separation of powers principle while preserving judi
cial authority over constitutional issues. 107 After all, there is "much
to be gained by reaffirming for the people the wonderful reality
that they govern themselves."108 In deciding the public-use ques
tion for constitutional purposes, "the Court has made clear that it
will not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to
106. John Martinez, Rational Legislating, 34 STETSON L. REv. 547, 560-61 (2005)
(citations omitted).
107. The power of eminent domain has its origins
in the long struggle for legislative supremacy which marked the history of rela
tions between Crown and Parliament, and which culminated in the American
Revolution. From a very early date, English law prevented the Crown from
divesting a subject of title to property, even when necessary for a public use.
Parliament alone had the power to expropriate land, and it did so exercising its
right to consent on behalf of the estates of the realm. American political theo
rists drew on this legal heritage. In the colonial and revolutionary periods,
Americans repeatedly declared that the power to expropriate private property
for a public purpose rested in the legislature alone. More importantly, Ameri
can legislatures repeatedly used their power of expropriation to effect all man
ner of social and economic engineering, frequently transferring property from
one private entity to another where it was thought that the transfer would
effect some greater economic purpose. Having vested their assemblies with
the power to expropriate property for public use, therefore, American politi
cal and legal theory left little room for supervision by the judicial branch. For,
to challenge the means by which legislative consent was given is to challenge
the representative nature of the legislature itself.
Harrington, supra note 29, at 1247.
108. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 464-65 (2000) (Scalia, J., dis
senting).
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what constitutes a public use 'unless the use be palpably without
reasonable foundation.' "109
Essentially, there are two very practical reasons for applying
deferential judicial review to questions of public use. First, the con
cept of "public use" is a slippery one that constantly changes. Pub
lic use varies over time as the needs of society evolve. The
vaporous nature of the public-use concept was classically described
by Justice Douglas:
An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless,
for each case must turn on its own facts. The definition is essen
tially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the
purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor histori
cally capable of complete definition. Subject to specific constitu
tional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such
cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the
public needs to be served by social legislation .... This principle
admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent do
main is involved. The role of the judiciary in determining
whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is an
extremely narrow one. 110

The second practical reason for applying deferential review to
questions of public use is that while courts are good at applying
principles of law, when "the principle is one of political will" courts
do better when they defer
to the political institutions that can best gauge the political senti
ment of the time ....
. . . . [This is not to say] that the political process will inevita
bly work itself pure, that local officials will never fail to favor
politically powerful developers over individual residents, even
when they collectively lobby for their position, especially when
those residents are likely-post-taking-to move to other juris
dictions and thus be less able to exact electoral redress from
those same local officials. Indeed, even comprehensive plans ...
can be designed and implemented in a manner that is ridden with
abuse. My claim is only that the capacity of the judiciary to make
inquiries into the process, to reverse engineer the political deci
sion to determine whether it was tainted or whether the same
109. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (quoting United
States v. Gettysburg Elee. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
110. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (citations omitted) (upholding a
redevelopment plan targeting a blighted area of Washington, D.C.).
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decision would have been reached on objective grounds, is mini
mal. Thus, perhaps the best that a court can do is to define the
conditions under which the probability of abuse is minimal and
defer to the political process when those criteria are satisfied. III

Once the great accommodation (in the form of judicial defer
ence) is made, all doubts about the correctness of the Kelo decision
disappear because the key facts of the Kelo case support the deci
sion made by the city council and other legislative bodies to utilize
the Connecticut eminent domain statute with respect to the Fort
Trumbull project.
E.

In Kelo, the Facts and the Law Overcome the Myths

The majority's decision in Kelo was correct for three reasons.
First, there were the facts found by the Superior Court trial
judge. ll2 The trial judge found that the development plan under
which the challenged takings were made would significantly impact
the socio-economic conditions in the New London region. The
judge also found that the revitalization efforts would generate jobs
and vital tax revenue for New London, where more than half the
area remains exempt from property tax,113 Moreover, all these
gains would take place in a distressed city that has experienced seri
ous employment declines.
Much of the consternation about the Kelo case consists of con
jecture. 114 Why should the "specter of condemnation"115 speak
louder in court than the reality on the ground?116 The City of New
111. Gillette, supra note 27, at 19-20 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
112. Kelo v. City of New London (Keto 1/), 843 A.2d 500, 508-11 (Conn. 2004)
(citations omitted), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
113. Id. at 510 (approximating between "518 and 867 construction jobs," "718 and
1362 direct jobs," and "500-940 indirect jobs"); see also Opposition Brief to Petition for
Certiorari, at *6, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004
WL 1877787.
114. Some misinformation about Pfizer's supposed involvement in the Keto tak
ings and the exceptional treatment of the Italian Dramatic Club led to popular specula
tion regarding the public-use issue; however, those factual theories were soundly
rejected by the courts. "The trial judge and all the members of the Supreme Court of
Connecticut agreed that there was no evidence of an illegitimate purpose in this case.
Therefore ... the City'S development plan was not adopted 'to benefit a particular class
of identifiable individuals.'" Kelo v. City of New London (Keto 1/1), 125 S. Ct. 2655,
2661-62 (2005) (citation omitted).
115. "The specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to pre
vent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shop
ping mall, or any farm with a factory." Id. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
116. In fact, the Connecticut Supreme Court emphasized that its decision was
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London did not use its power of eminent domain to replace a Motel
6 with a Ritz-Carlton.l17 "While such an unusual exercise of gov
ernment power would certainly raise a suspicion that a private pur
pose was afoot, the hypothetical cases posited by petitioners can be
confronted if and when they arise. They do not warrant the crafting
of an artificial restriction on the concept of public use."118
The phrase "public use" in the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment was not meant to be limited to "the exigencies of a few
years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of
which were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence."119
No human can foresee what changes the future will bring. The
Framers wisely recognized this fact of nature. They understood the
danger of imposing "restrictions and specifications, which, at the
present, might seem salutary"120 upon constitutional provisions like
the phrase "public use." Such unnecessary legalisms "might, in the
end, prove the overthrow of the system itself. "121 Instead, the
Framers used general terms like "public use" and left it "to the leg
islature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to effectuate
legitimate objects, and to mould and model the exercise of its pow
ers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests, should require."122
The New London plan called for replacing massive unemployment
with jobs, economic decay with economic prosperity, and pollution
with cleanliness. Implementation of the New London economic-de
velopment plan replaced conditions causing the financial collapse of
the Fort Trumbull peninsula with conditions stabilizing New
London's economy and creating hope for its future prosperity.
Second, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that under
"not a license for the unchecked use of the eminent domain power as a tax revenue
raising measure; rather, our holding is that rationally considered municipal economic
development projects such as the development plan in the present case pass constitu
tional muster." Kelo II, 843 A.2d at 543.
117. See Kelo Ill, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 2667 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). "Appellate opinions are
only as robust as the facts on which they are based. When those facts evaporate, the
opinion on which they rest is weakened as well." Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into
the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 269, 272 (1999).
119. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816) (discussing the
Constitution generally).
120. [d.
121. [d.
122. [d. at 326-27; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (stat
ing that the Constitution by its very nature "requires that only its great outlines should
be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose
those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves").
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state law,123 economic-development projects that benefit the public
by "creating new jobs, increasing tax and other revenues, and con
tributing to urban revitalization" will "satisfy the public use clauses
of the federal and state constitutions."124 Although the Supreme
Court may question the Connecticut court's federal constitutional
conclusion,125 the state constitutional conclusion should not be
questioned. 126 Moreover, in making its own decision on the public
use question, some deference should be given to the decision made
by the Connecticut Supreme Court:
The propriety of keeping in view by this court, while enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment, the diversity of local conditions and
of regarding with great respect the judgments of the state courts
upon what should be deemed public uses in that State, is ex
pressed, justified, and acted upon .... No case is recalled where
this court has condemned as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment a taking upheld by the state court as a taking for
public uses in conformity with its laws. . . . The cases ... show
how greatly we have deferred to the opinions of the state courts

123. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 (2006).
124. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo II), 843 A.2d 500, 555-56 (Conn. 2004)
(citations omitted), affd, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
125. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) ("The question, whether
a law be void for its repugnancy to the constitution, is, at all times, a question of much
delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative, in a doubtful
case. The court, when impelled by duty to render such a judgment, would be unworthy
of its station, could it be unmindful of the solemn obligations which that station im
poses. But it is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature is to
be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts to be considered as void.
The opposition between the constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels
a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other. "); see also Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,346-47 (1816) ("[A]dmitting that the judges
of the state courts are, and always will be, of as much learning, integrity, and wisdom, as
those of the courts of the United States ... does not aid the argument. ... The constitu
tion has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that state attach
ments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might some times obstruct
or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of
justice.").
126. Even apart from the interests of federalism, practicality suggests state judges
should be the ones to decide state constitutional law. A state's constitution is the legal
foundation for the organization of the state. It establishes and controls the state gov
ernment. To fully appreciate its provisions, it is necessary to be acquainted with the
history, law, and government of the state which preceded it as well as the philosophical
concepts upon which it is based. A state supreme court is much better suited to that
purpose than the United States Supreme Court. It is probable that the state supreme
court judges will have some experience in the state's legal system; however, the U.S.
Supreme Court may not.
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on this subject, which so closely concerns the welfare of their
people. 127
Third, the Connecticut legislature permitted public monies to
be spent to help Connecticut's distressed cities acquire property in
an approved project area and made such transactions a public
use. 128 The fact that these findings were made by the Connecticut
legislature, instead of Congress,
does not mean that judicial deference is less appropriate. Judicial
deference is required because, in our system of government, leg
islatures are better able to assess what public purposes should be
advanced by an exercise of the taking power. State legislatures
are as capable as Congress of making such determinations within
their respective spheres of authority. Thus, if a legislature, state
or federal, determines that there are substantial reasons for an
exercise of the taking power, courts must defer to its determina
tion that the taking will serve a public use. 129
The public-use issue in Kelo was answered by the Connecticut
legislature and the Connecticut judiciary. The taking of private
property by eminent domain in furtherance of a carefully planned,
publicly approved, economic-development plan that will create
prosperity in an economically distressed community is a public use
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. There is noth
ing inherently incompatible in these local Connecticut policy deci
sions with the "public use" phrase in the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Economic development of impoverished areas 10
America is not inconsistent with anything in the Constitution.
CONCLUSION

Revitalizing financially distressed American commumtles by
encouraging economic development is a constitutionally permissi
ble public use of the government's eminent domain power. Unem
ployment leads to poverty and drains the life out of a community.
Prosperous communities are the cornerstone upon which the stabil
ity of society is based. As Aristotle wrote, "poverty is the parent of
revolution and crime."130 The United States recognizes that "the
Nation's cities, towns, and smaller urban communities face critical
127.
omitted).
128.
129.
130.

Hairston v. Danville &

w. Ry.

Co., 208 u.s. 598, 607 (1908) (citations

Keto II, 843 A.2d at 512-13 n.13 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 (2006».
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (citations omitted).
ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 2.6.1265b12.
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social, economic, and environmental problems"131 and "the future
welfare of the Nation and the well-being of its citizens depend on
the establishment and maintenance of viable urban communities as
social, economic, and political entities."132 In too many parts of our
nation, there is polluted air, land, and water. People are impover
ished, unhealthy, uneducated, hungry, and homeless. Businesses
are failing. The public infrastructure is falling apart, and historical
treasures are neglected. These problems are private, personal trag
edies as well as societal failures. Solutions are neither cheap nor
easy. If they were, the problems would have been solved long ago.
Kelo shows that a public-private partnership can be a catalyst for
creating a viable foundation for a realistic long-term solution to lo
cal economic decay. Such a solution must be found to mitigate the
severity of, if not totally eradicate, the personal tragedies and sys
temic societal failures which poverty exacerbates.
Eminent domain is a governmental tool that can produce good
and bad results depending on how it is used. The Kelo case shows
that when economic development is expertly implemented through
a carefully planned and cooperative partnership between the public
and private sectors, the public gains. The Fort Trumbull area has
been revitalized into an area that attracts people. In fact, the Fort
Trumbull State Park now offers amenities such as walking paths, a
fishing pier, and a visitors' center. 133 New London is a place where
new jobs paying decent wages have replaced massive unemploy
ment and poverty has given way to prosperity. Every economically
distressed city, impoverished rural area, and underemployed and
unemployed American should be so fortunate.
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